

31 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM: Special Assistant

SUBJECT: Treaty Monitoring Study

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1. [] study on Treaty monitoring is, as stated, an uncoordinated "think" piece for internal use only.

2. However, based upon the number of disagreements with several premises by NFAC (opposite page), I recommend that, after your perusal, a coordinated NFAC, CT, RMS paper be prepared prior to discussion at an IC breakfast.

3. Specifically, I recommend:


☒ Your comments on [] paper

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☐ Announcement at the next IC breakfast that an IC Staff/Agency study is under way. Task appropriate program managers (CIA/State/NSA/NRO/DIA) to undertake and complete a similar but independent study by 31 October 1979. On that date studies are to be inter-circulated.

☐ In-depth, dedicated discussion of positions at an IC Retreat at [] on 16-17 November.

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August 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT: Treaty Monitoring Study (U)

1. Action Requested: That you review the attached study on the resource implications of SALT III and provide any comments you have so that we can use them to guide the completion of similar efforts on MBFR, CTBT and ASAT resource implications.

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2. Background: Following the conference, RMS was requested to conduct an exploratory study of the resource implications of possible arms control treaties. An examination of SALT III, MBFR, CTBT, and ASAT will include the following:

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- possible treaty provisions
- nature of treaty monitoring tasks
- description of current/future monitoring capabilities
- resource management implications.

At this time the SALT III portion is in first draft form, and the other treaty sections are approaching this stage. This study was already under way when you asked at the staff meeting on 15 August for NFAC, RMS, and CTS to focus our thinking on potential SALT III verification issues. (C)

3. Staff Comments: This study has drawn upon the existing efforts of other agencies (ACDA, State, CIA, DIA, etc.). However, the issues raised here do not reflect a coordinated position because at present the paper is felt to be essentially a "think" piece for your consideration and only for internal use. Other agencies are just beginning to organize SALT III study groups, so this RMS analysis should be

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SUBJECT: Treaty Monitoring Study (U)

considered an early input to more intensive examination of SALT III's intelligence implications. Once we receive and take account of your comments, we are prepared to circulate the paper to CT and NFAC, at least, and possibly (if you so choose) to those who attend the Community breakfast so that we can discuss the subject. At this time, three aspects of the problem appear to warrant further study by the Intelligence Community:

- How will SALT affect tasking management?
- What kind of cooperative measures will be required to monitor certain new weapons systems?
- How important are near-term collection investment decisions to the overall strategic and arms control-related intelligence missions?

It is the RMS view that the answers to these questions should be addressed by the entire Community since their judgments are needed about intelligence requirements before resource implications can be accurately drawn. In the case of investment decisions on future ELINT, IR, and FIS collection capabilities, they are likely to be made without too much attention to SALT III. This is probably correct, since an agreement will not change strategic intelligence requirements drastically, nor should they unilaterally drive critical investment decisions. In addition, it is to be expected that inclusion of TNF will raise the question of intelligence-sharing and verification procedures within the Alliance. This issue is not addressed here, since it involves political considerations, and other agencies will be primarily responsible for this planning. (S)

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SUBJECT: Treaty Monitoring Study

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DCI/RMS/PGO, (28 August 1979)

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*Can we fulfill that, add MBFR & 2-3
others, & still meet general intell
needs.*

*3. On top of that, then, do
longer term prospects for III plus
others of the 7 negotiation*

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
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SALT III

MONITORING STUDY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is limited to assessing likely effects of a post-1985 SALT III agreement on Intelligence Community resources. A conceivable treaty base case has been postulated which assumes further numerical reductions in SALT II limitations and modifications in qualitative constraints on mobile missiles, new ICBMs, and cruise missiles. The case also includes a framework for limiting modern long-range theater nuclear forces (TNF) in SALT III. The exact details of the treaty are necessarily speculative, but under any circumstances the Intelligence Community will be expected to monitor major Soviet strategic developments. (C)


In this regard, monitoring tasks associated with a future SALT accord comprise only one part of our total strategic military intelligence operations. Hence, it does not appear that SALT will, or necessarily should, drive Community investment decisions on our post-1985 collection capabilities.

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In summary, then, this report identifies three issues which should be given greater attention by the Community:

1. Projected Soviet strategic developments will require greater U.S. intelligence monitoring. It is not clear, however, that SALT per se is a major factor in expanding these intelligence requirements. There are non-SALT-limited strategic developments which will demand greater attention, and Soviet CCD practices could very well pose a greater strain on intelligence resources than SALT itself.
2. Several near-term investment decisions will affect our overall collection capabilities in the post-1985 period. Decisions on [redacted], FIS collection, and future ELINT assets will be important, but SALT monitoring will not necessarily be a primary factor in the selection of specific investment options. There may well be a tendency for system proponents to argue for particular capabilities in terms of SALT monitoring needs, but it should be borne in mind that arms control requirements are a derivative of our overall strategic intelligence mission.
3. Enhanced access to Soviet strategic developments will require an increasing expansion of "cooperative measures" within the SALT context. While we cannot rely totally on any mechanisms which the Soviets could later violate, these cooperative measures can enhance the effectiveness of programmed U.S. intelligence assets. The Intelligence Community should be investigating the design of cooperative measures involving deployment modes, data base exchanges, and non-interference provisions for NTM. This exercise will interact with the negotiations themselves but are intended to support policymakers' eventual judgments about a future treaty's verifiability as well. (S)

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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

VERIFICATION IMPLICATIONS

With or without a SALT III agreement, the spectrum of strategic intelligence requirements will continue to grow and necessitate some reallocation of Intelligence Community resources. However, a third generation arms control agreement will set in motion two trends which will have some implications for the management of intelligence assets. (C)

First, such a U.S.-Soviet treaty will make it politically necessary for the U.S. to have high level confidence that any militarily significant violations by the Soviet Union can be detected and effectively neutralized. Depending upon the type of Soviet system and the threat it poses, timely detection might vary from months to years; accordingly, U.S. intelligence assets will have to be aligned to give adequate consideration of any treaty breakout potentials. (U)

Second, SALT III will of necessity have to incorporate (indeed broaden) the current practice of using cooperative measures to enhance NTM. Given the nature of newer strategic weapons, special measures designed to guarantee both their verifiability and survivability will have to be built into the treaty. At the same time, such steps will partially temper increased verification needs and, at a minimum,

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
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CONCLUSIONS

Three major findings can be drawn from the preceding analysis. First, intelligence requirements will grow in the 1980s as more sophisticated Soviet strategic and theater nuclear weapons are deployed and concealment practices are expanded. However, treaty monitoring responsibilities per se will not expand the list of strategic intelligence targets; rather, they will demand more and better quality coverage of those new targets which are SALT-related. Because of the political need to verify treaties with high-confidence, more collection tasking and processing will be directed at important strategic installations, which may affect the overall resource management process. (S)



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